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I.

INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed a profound and troubling communitarian deficit in

American society. When the very severe pandemic swept the U.S., state governments ordered
Americans to don masks, primarily to protect other Americans from disease and death (although
the masks were later said to offer some benefits to the wearer as well). A very large number
refused, a good part of them for principled reasons. Some argued the government did not have
constitutional authority to mandate masks and that such mandates violated individual rights; but
above all, these anti-maskers wanted to be left alone. When vaccines became available but
required wide acceptance by the general public in order to be effective, the nation faced strong
resistance, often from the same individuals who resisted the masks. This response comes despite
the fact that, on a given day, the pandemic can kill more people than were lost on 9/11 or at Pearl
Harbor, both of which led to various widely supported counter mobilizations.2 This
unwillingness to serve the common good—even when the costs and risks to the individual are
minimal and the benefits to the common good are high—is a clear indication of a severe
communitarian deficit. This deficit is also reflected in the political polarization that has
overtaken the country and in the country’s inability to reach shared understandings crucial for
effective governance.
As is the case in many countries, in the U.S. there is a complex interaction between
jurisprudence (the philosophy of law) and public discourse. American legal doctrine strongly
protects individual rights but offers no grounds for courts to consider the common good 3.

2

COVID-19 Deaths Surpass 9/11 Deaths in Single Day, WebMD (December 10, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20201210/covid-19-deaths-surpass-911-deaths-in-single-day.
3
U.S. CONST. Because some hold that there is no common good, merely an aggregation of individual
goods, I note that the term “common good” refers to goods that serve no one individual but future
generations. Examples include basic research, climate control, public safety, and public health.
208

This article will examine four court cases that directly deal with this communitarian
deficit. It will also explore the ways courts have dealt with the issue of when individual rights
yield to the common good.
II.

LIBERAL COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT
The best-known version of communitarianism is the East Asian school system, which

emphasizes prioritizing the common good and one’s obligations to the community. It teaches that
individuals are part of an organic whole and can find their meaning in their contributions to the
whole. In this version of communitarianism, there is no fundamental place for liberty or
individual rights, although such rights may be granted if they would advance the common good. 4
Western intellectuals, and all others who consider individual right self-evident, soundly
reject East Asian communitarianism. Liberal communitarianism combines two fundamentally
opposing philosophies, liberalism and communitarianism. Liberal communitarianism assumes,
from the outset, that a society ought to treat both individual rights and the common good as basic
moral principles; and a society should not assume, a priori, that one trumps the other. Liberal
communitarianism does not overlook the fundamentally incompatible nature of liberalism and
communitarianism; rather, it seeks to embrace their incompatibilities because one’s strength is
the other’s deficiency. Liberal communitarians recommend constant balancing of these two
moral principles; liberal communitarianism requires legislators and citizens to weigh the
common good against individual rights and to create policies and social norms that protect

4

Late Singapore Leader Lee Kuan Yew Had Opinions on Everything, TIME (Mar. 15, 2015),
https://time.com/3748654/singapore-lee-kuan-yews-opinions/; see also WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN
VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998).
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both. And, when the common good conflicts with individual liberty, a liberal communitarian
society must rule which should take precedence.
The Fourth Amendment captures the basic liberal communitarian thesis extremely well.
Unlike the First Amendment, which states that “Congress shall make no law,”5 the Fourth
Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” 6,” which on its face
recognizes a whole category of searches and seizures that are constitutional—those that are
reasonable, i.e., in the public interest. Therefore, like liberal communitarianism, it recognizes
both rights and the common good. (The new golden rule). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment
establishes the courts as a mechanism for determining the permissibility of searches and seizures.
Societies constantly correct the balance between individual rights and social
responsibilities as cultural values change. For example, after 9/11, Congress quickly passed a
series of new security measures. 7 When no new attacks occurred over the next decade, these
measures were reined in. 8
In short, liberal communitarians hold that no society should be designed according to one
set of principles, that liberal communitarian societies can fall along a continuum (meaning that
some may be more liberal or more communitarian than others), and that the relative weight

5

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

6

U.S CONST. amend. IV.

7

9-11 Commission, Homeland Security, and Intelligence Reform, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/issues/911-commission.
8

Amitai Etzioni, HOW PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT? FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY IN THE AGE OF
TERRORISM 38-42 (2004).
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accorded to the two sets of principles must not be fixed but, rather, must be adapted to change
with changing societal values. 9
III.

THE COURTS’ STRUGGLE
When I mentioned this article’s thesis to a colleague, she exclaimed, “But neither the

common good nor the public interest are mentioned in the Constitution!” After discussing, we
agreed that the phrase “in Order to form a more perfect Union”10 has such overtones; however,
these words are in the Constitution’s Preamble, and, though often cited by public speakers, have
no legal standing or heft. None of the cases under study mention them. 11 Instead, we shall see
that courts, when they draw on the concept of the common good, make ad hoc statements not
anchored in any constitutional foundation; and they must invent grounds on which the common
good may prevail.
A. THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST/SPECIAL NEEDS V. PRIVACY
In 1983, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) reviewed accident reports dating
back to 1972 and determined they would increase regulation to address alcohol and drug
impairment of on-duty railroad employees.12 The review found that, during that decade, “the
nation’s railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use

9

For more discussion of liberal communitarianism, see Philip Selznick, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH:
SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1998) and Amitai Etzioni, THE NEW GOLDEN
RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND MY BROTHER’S KEEPER: A
MEMOIR AND A MESSAGE (1996).
10

U.S. CONST. pmbl.

The same holds true for the phrase, “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.” Id.
12
Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989).
11
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as a probable cause or contributing factor.”13 The twenty-one accidents “resulted in 25 fatalities,
61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27 million
in 1982 dollars).”14 Additionally, alcohol or drugs contributed to another seventeen railroad
employees’ deaths at work.15
These findings prompted the FRA to institute new regulations delineating actions that
railroad companies were required or permitted establishing procedures for resting employees for
drug and alcohol-impairment in 1985.16 The regulations required railroad employees and other
covered employees to submit blood and urine samples to an independent medical center for drug
and alcohol tests after certain accidents. 17 The Railway Labor Executives’ Association claimed
the regulations were unconstitutional and sued to prevent their implementation.. 18 The case,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, ultimately reached the Supreme Court in 1988, and
the Court decided it the following year. The Court decided the case in favor of the regulations,
seven-to-two, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia,
Stevens, and White taking the majority opinion (written by Kennedy) and Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissenting.19

13

Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations, 48 Fed. Reg. 30726 (July 5, 1983).

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608-612.

19

Id. at 605.
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Both the majority and dissenting opinions discussed the Fourth Amendment. The
majority opinion noted “the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but
only those that are unreasonable.”20 Further, it cited Court precedent to establish that
reasonableness is context-specific—it depends on the particular circumstances in question—and
must be calculated by weighing the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals against valid
government interests. The Court generally considered a search or seizure reasonable following
the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause. 21 However, in this discussion, the Court did
not explain how a judge or magistrate should weigh the government’s interest against the rights
of individuals in determining the existence of probable cause. 22 Hence, it is unclear whether the
decision to issue a warrant, and thus the reasonableness of a search, is based on a judge or
magistrate’s discretion.
In this case, the Court held that the blood and urine testing did not need probable cause or
a warrant because the railroad tested all relevant employees after certain accidents even if they
showed no signs of impairment. However, the majority created a “special needs” exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he Government’s
interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety” made the railroad
regulations a “special needs” case. 23
First, the Court explained:
An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring
citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary
acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized
20

Id. at 619.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 619
Id. at 620.

23
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by law, and that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope. A warrant also provides
the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination
whether an intrusion is justified in any given case [citations omitted].24
The Court argued that the purposes of a warrant were inapplicable in this case because
the regulations already defined and limited the intrusions on individual rights, the Court assumed
covered employees were familiar with the regulations, and the regulations provided a
standardized system that did not require a neutral magistrate’s discernment. 25 Further, the Court
held that because the bloodstream and breath naturally eliminate alcohol and other drugs over
time, securing a warrant before drawing blood or conducting a breath test could result in the loss
of important evidence.26
In this case, however, the Court did not explicitly state that allowing railroad employees
to work while impaired endangers the common good. Instead, the Court provided a narrow, ad
hoc exemption to the warrant requirement, tailored to the specific situation, relying on a concept
that has no place in the Constitution—namely special needs. Although stare decisis is a key
element of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, a strong normative case is benefited when it is firmly
anchored in constitutional law, as was the case when the concept of privacy was in effect added
to it.
After discussing warrants, the Court examined probable cause. First, the Court
acknowledged permissible warrantless searches typically require both probable cause and
individualized suspicion. However, reasonable searches may occur “[i]n limited
circumstances[:(1)] where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and

24

Id.

25

Id. at 622.

26

Id. at 623–624.
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[(2)]where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion . . . .”27 The majority asserted that the
railroad regulations belonged among those “limited circumstances.”28 Here, the Court introduced
a criterion to determine when individual rights or the common good should yield. However, the
Court uses different criteria in different cases, demonstrating liberal communitarian
jurisprudence needs development and consolidation.
The Court relied on two primary reasons to argue that blood, breath, and urine tests are
not significant intrusions on privacy. First, employment often involves restrictions on movement,
so any intrusions related to transportation or movement for blood extraction, breath, and urine
samples imposed by the regulations did not fall far outside workplace privacy norms. Second, the
Court argued that none of the tests under consideration were invasive. Blood tests, when
performed properly, are a reasonable, routine, and safe part of physical examinations, involve
negligible risk, and require a miniscule blood extraction.29 Breath tests impose an even less
infringement on bodily autonomy and private health information. 30 Although the majority noted
that urine tests presented a privacy challenge, the regulations aimed to respect privacy
concerns.31 In addition, the Court held that covered railroad employees have a lower expectation
of privacy than other individuals because they are involved in an industry that imposes strict

27

Id. at 624.

28
29

Id.
Id. at 625 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).

30

Id.

31

Id. at 624. While urine tests are less physically invasive than blood tests, the way urine samples are
collected present a privacy challenge. Id.
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safety regulations, including some regulations related to health and fitness.32 Therefore, the
Court held that, on the whole, the government’s invasion of privacy in this case was limited.
The Court used the concept of “government interest” as a stand-in for the common good,
and, much like “special needs” and the “common good” discussed above, “government interest”
is not in the Constitution. Further, the Court incorporated the phrase “government interest” in
some cases that deal with the common good, but not in others. The Court determined that “the
Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compelling.
Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that
even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.” 33 Moreover,
“employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human loss
before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others.”34 Additionally, the
majority claimed that the regulations serve as a deterrent because employees taking the tests will
likely lose their jobs if they are impaired. 35 Even if employees are confident they will not behave
abnormally if they drink or use drugs at or before work, employees know that, due to the
regulations, they will be caught and fired if a triggering event occurs.36 Thus, according to the
majority, the public safety (a common good), the potential lack of observable evidence of

32

Id. at 624–628.

33

Id. at 628.

34

Id.
Id. at 628–629.

35

36

See id., Because employees cannot predict when an accident will happen, notice of the regulations will
prevent them from engaging in such risky behavior.

216

impairment, and the need for a deterrent all justify searches of railroad employees without
individualized suspicion.37
The Court also reasoned that the alcohol and drug tests mandated by the regulations in
the wake of an accident would foster research and provide helpful clues in accident investigation.
These clues, in turn, would allow the railroads “to take appropriate measures to safeguard the
general public.”38 This data can inform the railroad company as it moves forward in its efforts to
understand the accident and prevent future accidents. 39 Similarly, tests that are permitted based
on a particular employee’s rule violation may help railroads determine whether alcohol or drugrelated impairment is the issue. 40 Following an accident or rule violation, requiring
particularized suspicion could prevent the railroad from obtaining crucial evidence because
chaos after an accident and the difficulty of observing all forms of impairment could allow
covered employees to avoid suspicion.. 41
The majority determined that ultimately, “[i]n view of our conclusion that, on the present
record, the toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on
the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees, the Government's compelling
interests outweigh privacy concerns.”42

37

Id.

38

Id. at 630 (majority opinion).

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 630–631.
Id. at 633.

42
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Justice Marshall, in his dissent, which was joined by Justice Brennan, saw a need for
balancing individual rights and the common good. However, he held that the invasion of privacy
was too high and the weight of the common good not high enough to allow the kind of searches
stipulated in the regulations. He wrote:
I recognize that invalidating the full-scale searches involved in the FRA's testing regime
for failure to comport with the Fourth Amendment's command of probable cause may
hinder the Government's attempts to make rail transit as safe as humanly possible. But
constitutional rights have their consequences, and one is that efforts to maximize the
public welfare, no matter how well-intentioned, must always be pursued within
constitutional boundaries. Were the police freed from the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment for just one day to seek out evidence of criminal wrongdoing, the resulting
convictions and incarcerations would probably prevent thousands of fatalities. Our
refusal to tolerate this spectre reflects our shared belief that even beneficent governmental
power—whether exercised to save money, save lives, or make the trains run on time—
must always yield to “a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.” Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 266, 413 U. S. 273 (1973). The Constitution demands no less
loyalty here.43
The dissent’s disapproval of the FRA’s post-accident testing regulations focused on their
invasiveness and the importance of probable cause and warrants in all extensive searches.
Addressing the importance of probable cause and warrants, the dissent held that “the majority
ignores the text and doctrinal history of the Fourth Amendment, which require that highly
intrusive searches of this type be based on probable cause, not on the evanescent cost-benefit
calculations of agencies or judges.”44 The dissent also argued the Warrant Clause is essential to
the Fourth Amendment’s meaning because warrant requirements serve as the reasonableness
standard for searches and seizures. In the words of the dissent, “Constitutional requirements like
probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present when advantageous, conveniently absent

43

Id. at 649-650 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

44

Id. at 636.
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when ‘special needs’ make them seem not.”45 Later, the dissent continued its argument against
“special needs,” claiming the majority was making decisions based on policy, not the
Constitution, and was straying too far from the Constitution’s protections:
The fact is that the malleable “special needs” balancing approach can be justified only on
the basis of the policy results it allows the majority to reach. The majority's concern with
the railroad safety problems caused by drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cavalier
disregard for the text of the Constitution is not. There is no drug exception to the
Constitution, any more than there is a communism exception or an exception for other
real or imagined sources of domestic unrest. 46
This argument highlights this article’s thesis that there is a need to anchor the common good in
the Constitution in the way the Court has anchored privacy in the Constitution in other cases.
The second part of the dissent focused on the specific searches at issue. While—as noted
above—the dissent disagreed with the “special needs” reasoning used by the majority, it agreed
that “the importance of collecting blood and urine samples before drug or alcohol metabolites
disappear justifies waiving the warrant requirement for those two searches under the narrow
‘exigent circumstances’ exception.”47 However, according to the dissent, the chemical analysis
of the samples constitutes a separate search. Given that blood and urine samples remain usable as
long as they are appropriately preserved, the “exigent circumstances” exception no longer
applies to the testing of the samples. Hence, by the dissent’s logic, the extraction may not require
a warrant, but the testing does. 48
The dissent also took issue with the Court’s characterization of the searches, claiming
that the majority diminished the invasiveness of the extraction of blood, the collection of urine,

45

Id. at 637.

46

Id. at 641.

47

Id. at 642.
Id. at 642–643.

48
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and the analysis of the samples. Blood sample retrieval requires using a needle to break the
surface of a person’s skin, an act intruding upon their physical being. Chemical analysis of blood
and urine samples can reveal deeply personal and private information, including medical
disorders and medication information. Finally, the dissent argued that permitting searches
without probable cause or individualized suspicion, even in a heavily-regulated industry, would
aggravate.49 The dissent holds:
The benefits of suspicionless blood and urine testing are far outstripped by the costs
imposed on personal liberty by such sweeping searches. Only by erroneously deriding as
“minimal” the privacy and dignity interests at stake, and by uncritically inflating the
likely efficacy of the FRA's testing program, does the majority strike a different
balance.50
The dissent further noted that the regulations allowed the government to use these searches,
though civil in this case, in criminal prosecutions, which exacerbated the trespass by allowing
suspicionless searches to lead to criminal consequences.
Further, the dissent disapproved of the use of urine samples, noting that the FRA
acknowledges that urinalysis may show drug or alcohol use dating back up to two months but
may not show current impairment. Thus, mandating urinalysis may not further the FRA’s
purposes as testing is meant to determine on-duty impairment not irrelevant past recreational
use.51 Moreover, the dissent agreed with and quoted Justice Stevens’s concurrence regarding the
supposed deterrent function of the regulations, concluding that “[i]t is, of course, the fear of the
accident, not the fear of a post-accident revelation, that deters.”52 Given this determination, the

49

Id. at 644–649.

50
51

Id. at 650.
Id. at 650–652.

52

Id. at 653.
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only remaining argument in favor of the government interest is that the regulatory testing regime
would help post-accident investigations. However, the dissent stated that this “seems a slender
thread from which to hang such an intrusive program,”53 especially because this evidence alone
is not sufficient to determine an accident’s cause, and the necessary corroborative evidence could
be used to form particularized suspicion that could justify a search in the first place. 54
The dissent’s arguments attest to the lack of clear balancing criteria.
I.

States’ Interests: drivers under the influence of alcohol killed over 25,000 people
and injured nearly one million more in the studied time span.55 In 1986, the
Michigan Department of State Police created a pilot program to introduce
sobriety checkpoints on selected state roads.56 Law enforcement officials would
create a checkpoint on a road and stop every vehicle traveling through the
checkpoint, looking for indications that the driver might be intoxicated. The
police permitted motorists without signs of intoxication to proceed, while
subjecting additional screening, and, if necessary, arrest, on those that showed
signs of intoxication. The sobriety checkpoints became the subject of a lawsuit
that alleged they infringed upon Fourth Amendment rights.57 On February 27,
1990, the Supreme Court heard the case, Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz. The Court published its decision on June 14, 1990.58 Chief Justice

53

Id. at 653.

54

Id. at 653–654.

55

Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).

56
57

Id.
Id. at 447–448.

58

Id. at 444.
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Rehnquist wrote for the majority, which found, in a 6-3 vote, that Michigan’s
sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justices
Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and White joined in the majority opinion, and
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens dissented.59
The majority began by stating, “No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the
drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it.”60 The Court cites both anecdotal
and statistical evidence to support its observation. It also draws on the balancing notion, stating
that “the weight bearing on the other scale—the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped
briefly at sobriety checkpoints—is slight.”61 Based on this reasoning, the Court ruled that the
common good outweighs individual rights.
The majority also examined lower courts’ use of a still different balancing criterion, an
“effectiveness” test, which sought to evaluate the legitimacy of the checkpoint program. The
lower courts considered the efficacy of the checkpoints as part of their analysis of “‘the degree to
which the seizure advance[d] the public interest,’” which is part of a standard that the Court
utilized in the 1979 decision for Brown v. Texas.62The majority asserted:
This passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials
to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Experts in police
science might disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is
preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among

59

Id. at 444–445.

Id. at 451. Note that the Court introduces a different term here, namely the “States’ interest,” which
seems to replace the term “government interest.”
60

61
62

Id. at 451.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
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such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite
number of police officers.63
Here, the government decides what is effective. However, after claiming that the judicial branch
is not the appropriate governmental arm to determine policy effectiveness, the Court uses the
data from Saginaw County, Michigan and other checkpoint initiatives to try to show the
checkpoint program’s effectiveness. The Michigan program led to two drunk driving arrests
from 126 detained vehicles, which amounted to an arrest rate of approximately 1.5%. other states
found sobriety checkpoint arrest rates of approximately one percent. In contrast, only 0.12% of
vehicles going through illegal immigrant checkpoints were engaged in human smuggling, for an
arrest rate of 0.5% (because some vehicles contained multiple people), and the Court approved of
those searches.64
Ultimately, the Court’s ruling rested on the conclusion that “the balance of the State's
interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to
advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly
stopped, weighs in favor of the state program.”65
Three justices dissented from this decision, and two wrote dissents. One is by Justice
Brennan, who Justice Marshall joined. 66 The other is by Justice Stevens, and Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined his dissent for Parts I and II.67 They, too, joined the data analysis. In the

63

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453–454.

64

Id. at 454–455.

65
66

Id. at 455.
Id. at 445.

67

Id. at 445.
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introduction to his dissent, Justice Stevens raised concerns about the efficacy of sobriety
checkpoints. He noted that “the record in this case makes clear that a decision holding these
suspicionless seizures unconstitutional would not impede the law enforcement community’s
remarkable progress in reducing the death toll on our highways.”68 In fact, a study comparing
traffic statistics found that alcohol-related accidents fell by ten percent in a Maryland county
with sobriety checkpoints and 11 percent in a Maryland county without sobriety checkpoints.
Fatal accidents in the county without sobriety checkpoints dropped approximately eighty-one
percent (from sixteen percent to three percent), while fatal accidents in the county with sobriety
checkpoints increased twofold. With these facts in mind, Justice Stevens determined that the
Court used an improperly weighed balancing test.69 In concluding the introduction to his dissent,
he wrote that the majority decision both “overvalues the law enforcement interest in using
sobriety checkpoints” and “undervalues the citizen's interest in freedom from random,
unannounced investigatory seizures.”70 He also disputed the majority’s claim that sobriety
checkpoints, which may change locations and rely on surprise, are the same as permanent
checkpoints.71
Both Justices Stevens and Brennan highlighted differences between the circumstances of
this case and the circumstances of an earlier case on which the majority relied for precedent. 72
The earlier case, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, allowed suspicionless searches of the general

68

Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

69

Id. at 461–462.

70

Id. at 462.

71

Id. at 462–463.

72

Id. at 460
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public, and, at least at the time of the Sitz decision, was the only other case to do so.73 As a result,
distinguishing Martine-Fuerte from Sitz was significant. Justice Stevens discussed several
differences between fixed checkpoints (as utilized in Martinez-Fuerte) and moveable
checkpoints (as used in Sitz) and asserted that these differences call into question the majority’s
precedential reliance on Martinez-Fuerte. Pop-up sobriety checkpoints typically operate at night,
are based on surprise, and induce feelings of being targeted. Sobriety checkpoints also allow for
discretion regarding the location, timing, and officer activities, as they are not mere identification
checks, and any suspicion on the part of an officer, even if it stems from a motorist’s ruddy
complexion or speech impediment, could lead to a longer detention. 74
In other sections, Justices Brennan and Stevens continued to distinguish Martinez-Fuerte,
calling into question its applicability. 75 Justice Brennan explained that, in Martinez-Fuerte, the
Court reasoned that heavy traffic impeded law enforcement officials’ ability to observe particular
cars for suspicious behavior but that was not at issue in this case. 76 Justice Stevens, on the other
hand, argued that bringing illegal immigrants into the country is irrelevant to a driver’s skills,
increasing the need for checkpoints. 77 Drunk driving is different because it leads to observable
changes in drivers’ skills; thus, stopping everyone, including many innocent people, is
unnecessary for efforts to catch those who drive drunk.78 Both the majority and dissenting

73

Id. at 463–464.; Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976)).
74

Id. at 463–465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

75

Id. at 463–464.; Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976)).
76

Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

77

Id. at 463–465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

78

Id. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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justices ruled that it is up to government officials to determine what is effective. However, all
justices weighed policy considerations, adding to the lack of clarity around balancing: who will
determine the relevant facts of the case?
A different part of Justice Stevens’ dissent focused on the majority’s reliance on the
balancing test in explaining its decision. 79 First, Justice Stevens asserted that, while highway
safety is clearly a serious public concern, precedent shows that this alone is not enough to justify
a suspicionless search. 80 While he reiterated his distaste for surprise checkpoint programs and
believed such pop-up seizures were more than minimal infringements on individual liberty,
Justice Stevens conceded that a portion of his dissent may represent a fundamental, but
expected, difference of opinion with regard to constitutional interpretation. 81
Further, Justice Stevens noted that the statistics used by the Court did not align with the
reasons that law enforcement authorities gave to support their use of sobriety checkpoint
programs, as both Michigan law enforcement officials and a Maryland officer primarily cited the
program’s value as a deterrent, not as a source of arrests. Justice Stevens approved deterrence as
a law enforcement technique.82 However, he noted that the effectiveness of a deterrence program
could not be measured “by counting the arrests that were made”; rather, effectiveness must be
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based on “measur[ing] the number of crimes that were avoided.” 83 The majority opinion does not
follow this logic.84
Brennan’s dissent pushes back against the Court’s use of a balancing test, but Brennan
adds a different reason. Brennan argues that balancing tests are not the usual yardstick courts use
to judge searches and seizures.85 Brennan states, “In most cases, the police must possess
probable cause for a seizure to be judged reasonable. Only when a seizure is ‘substantially less
intrusive’ than a typical arrest is the general rule replaced by a balancing test [citation
omitted].”86 Although Brennan does not dispute the Court’s judgment that the invasiveness of the
initial sobriety checkpoint stop is small enough for it to fall within the latter category, he
nevertheless disagrees with the majority’s decision and argument. He holds that “[t]he Court
ignores the fact that, in this class of minimally intrusive searches, [the Court has] generally
required the Government to prove that it had reasonable suspicion for a minimally intrusive
seizure to be considered reasonable.”87 Further, Brennan argues that Court precedent and the
Fourth Amendment require the individualization of suspicion before a search or seizure can take
place.88 In this case, “[b]y holding that no level of suspicion is necessary before the police may
stop a car for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the Court potentially subjects the
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general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the police.” 89 The Court seems to have
difficulty determining what amounts to reasonable suspicion.
In Part III of Stevens’s dissent, which Brennan and Marshall do not join, Stevens raises a
few final points. He starts by asserting that “[t]he most disturbing aspect of the Court's decision
today is that it appears to give no weight to the citizen's interest in freedom from suspicionless
unannounced investigatory seizures.”90 Then, he suggests that the Court’s willingness to
completely discount this interest and its effort to support law enforcement might be attributable
to the majority’s intense desire to do something to promote highway safety.91 This leads Stevens
to declare that, while he opposes temporary, movable checkpoints, his dissent does not apply to
other standard law enforcement techniques that do not rely on surprise. For example, he has no
issue with metal detectors in airports and other public buildings. Similarly, he suggests that he
would not raise the same constitutional objections as he did in this case if a state were to add
mandated breathalyzer tests, affecting all drivers, to its toll roads, as such a system could be
fixed in place (and therefore would not rely on surprise) and would not be subject to arbitrary
geographic or procedural decisions. 92 After showing he is willing to allow for certain
warrantless, suspicionless, universally applied searches to protect the public, he concludes by
stating his opposition to sobriety checkpoints by writing that they “are elaborate, and disquieting,
publicity stunts.”93 Further, as he concludes, he states, “This is a case that is driven by nothing
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more than symbolic state action -- an insufficient justification for an otherwise unreasonable
program of random seizures.”94
Brennan disagrees with Stevens’s determination regarding the extent to which sobriety
checkpoints infringe upon people’s rights. 95 However, he nevertheless dissents from the
majority’s decision on constitutional grounds. Near the end of his dissent, Brennan writes:
Without proof that the police cannot develop individualized suspicion that a
person is driving while impaired by alcohol, I believe the constitutional balance
must be struck in favor of protecting the public against even the “minimally
intrusive” seizures involved in this case.
I do not dispute the immense social cost caused by drunken drivers, nor do I slight
the government's efforts to prevent such tragic losses. Indeed, I would hazard a
guess that today's opinion will be received favorably by a majority of our society,
who would willingly suffer the minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint stop in
order to prevent drunken driving. But consensus that a particular law enforcement
technique serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of
constitutional analysis.96
All of this valuable give-and-take highlights the need for clearer criteria regarding what
constitutes minimally intrusive searches—and whether conditions exist where the compelling
needs of the common good could not justify even more intrusive searches. For instance, does
concern for the common good extend to requiring people to allow the search of their laptops
when they enter the U.S.?
Finally, one passage in Stevens’s dissent remains particularly relevant today, given the
national conversation regarding the police's use of force and escalation during traffic stops:
To be law abiding is not necessarily to be spotless, and even the most virtuous can
be unlucky. Unwanted attention from the local police need not be less
discomforting simply because one’s secrets are not the stuff of criminal
prosecutions. Moreover, those who have found—by reason of prejudice or
misfortune—that encounters with the police may become adversarial or
94

Id. at 477.

95

Id. at 459.

96

Id. at 459.
229

unpleasant without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop
designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior. Being stopped by the police is
distressing even when it should not be terrifying, and what begins mildly may by
happenstance turn severe. 97
These important lines introduce a whole new consideration to the balancing analysis. Namely,
those who claim to serve the common good must commit to serving it, rather than abusing the
mantle.

A. THE COMMON GOOD IS RECOGNIZED BUT DELEGATED
On December 6, 1904, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Jacobson v.
Massachusetts.98 The Court released its decision on February 20, 1905. The case concerns the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts state law that allowed a city or town’s board of health to
mandate that adult residents within their community obtain free vaccinations or revaccinations.99
Those who did not comply with such a requirement would subject themselves to a five dollar
fine.100 Children with a signed certificate from a doctor did not have to receive the mandated
vaccinations.101 During smallpox outbreak in 1902, the Cambridge, Massachusetts Board of
Health used its authority under the state law to order the vaccination or revaccination of all
residents.102 The appellant in this case refused to comply with the order and therefore became the
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defendant in a criminal case. 103 He pleaded not guilty.104 The judge did not allow the defendant
to present many of his arguments, nor did he give the jury the instructions the defendant
requested.105 The jury found the defendant guilty. 106 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld the trial court judge’s decisions and allowed the jury’s verdict to stand. 107
The Supreme Court sustained the lower court’s rulings.108 Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote
the majority opinion.109 (Two justices dissented from the decision, but they do not appear to have
published written dissents). 110
The majority opinion begins by quickly dispelling two ideas put forth by the plaintiff
regarding the Constitution.111 First, the Court asserts that the Preamble of the Constitution has no
standing in law.112 The plaintiff argued “that the particular section of the statute of Massachusetts
now in question (§ 137, chap. 75) is in derogation of rights secured by the preamble of the
Constitution of the United States.”113 In response, Justice Harlan wrote:
Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people
ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source
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of any substantive power conferred on the Government of the United States or on
any of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the
body of the Constitution and such as may be implied from those so granted. 114
In other words, courts must reject any argument based on the Preamble to the Constitution, as
there are no powers associated with the words of the Preamble, and they may only interpret and
rule on the powers enumerated in the Constitution’s articles and amendments.115 This ruling
confirms that the Preamble, especially the reference to “a more perfect Union,” lack legal
standing.116
Second, the court addresses the appellant’s claim that the Massachusetts statute infringes
upon “the spirit of the Constitution.”117 The Court discounts this argument, holding that the case
under consideration can be decided solely based on the words of the Constitution and their literal
meanings, and not by delving into their spirit. 118
The primary question before the Court in this case concerns the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts law allowing local boards of health to mandate vaccinations and imposing a
penalty on those who refused to receive the locally-required inoculations.119 According to the
majority, the authority under consideration is the police power of the state, a power whose
bounds had remained undefined by the Supreme Court, at least up to that point. 120 However, the
Court had upheld quarantine laws and other health laws that would only impact activities within
114
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the border of the state that enacted the law. 121 The Court’s approval of such laws rests on the
need to safeguard the public: “According to settled principles, the police power of a State must
be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.” 122 To carry out these duties,
states may delegate their powers in this regard to local authorities, and the discretion of the states
and the localities are bound by the fact that neither can infringe on the federal powers or
individual rights laid out in the Constitution.123
As other public health laws are deemed to be constitutional, and thus do not seem to
present a conflict with the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution, the next line of inquiry
in determining the constitutionality of the Massachusetts law focuses on the question of
individual rights.124 Although the defendant holds that the law infringes upon his individual
rights, the Court disagrees.125 As the majority puts it:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person
within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.126
The Court follows this sentiment with quotations from previous cases making the same
point, explaining that rights are both restrained by and dependent upon provisions ensuring the
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common good.127 Further, the Constitution of Massachusetts explicitly refers to the common
good, and case law shows that “[t]he good and welfare of the Commonwealth, of which the
legislature is primarily the judge, is the basis on which the police power rests in
Massachusetts.”128 Here common good is cited, rather than the government interest or the state’s
interest.129
Regarding the question of who will determine what is in the common good, in this
particular case, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a law that delegated its authority to local
boards of health. The purpose of this provision was to ensure that vaccinations would only be
mandated for residents “when, in the opinion of the Board of Health, that was necessary for the
public health or the public safety.”130 Considering that some individual or group must have the
authority to decide on the best course of action during an emergency, the Court asserts that a
local board of health is a reasonable choice, as its members presumably have both local
knowledge and the necessary subject matter expertise.131
The vaccinations under consideration in this protect against smallpox. 132 The majority
holds that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the
right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members.”133 When the city of Cambridge put its regulations in place, smallpox cases within city
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limits were numerous and growing despite the fact that the smallpox vaccine was in common
use.134 Hence, the Court determined that it “would usurp the functions of another branch of
government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the
State, to protect the people at large, was arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of the
case.”135 The majority acknowledges that its judgment in this case may not apply in all cases. 136
It is possible, and precedent shows, that regulations meant to protect the community could be
enacted “in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary,
unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what it reasonably required for the safety of the
public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”137
However, in this case, the objection is based on the idea that the community protection is
“distressing, inconvenient or objectionable to some,” and, as such, “it was the duty of the
constituted authorities primarily to keep in view the welfare, comfort and safety of the many, and
not permit the interests of the many to be subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the
few.”138 The Court cites the need to quarantine citizens entering the country from a ship which
was known to have included passengers with contagious diseases, such as yellow fever and the
military draft, as other instances in which the need to protect the community might override
individual rights.139
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Another issue is what body of evidence is relevant and who is authorized to determine
what evidence may inform the rulings of the court. An objection raised by the appellant relates to
his rejected attempts to introduce evidence in his defense. The Court finds that the pieces of
evidence the defendant wished to put forth were “more formidable by their number than by their
inherent value.”140 The defendant primarily based his evidence on the idea that vaccinations did
not significantly contribute to the protection of populations from the proliferation of smallpox, as
well as the suggestion that vaccinations could actually cause health problems. 141 While some
medical professionals subscribed to those theories, they ran counter to accepted medical
authorities’ findings about vaccinations, and courts were aware of that fact. 142 Further, the
majority notes that the Massachusetts legislature must have known about the opponents of
vaccination when it enacted the law in question, and the legislature had to make a decision about
what to do to best serve the public health. 143 The Court rules that, for the most part, courts and
juries have no place in such decisions—they are up to the discretion of the legislature. 144 A brief
exploration of the exception to this general rule regarding the separation of powers follow this
determination.145 The case at hand does not meet this standard, as the common practice of
mandatory smallpox vaccinations for children in public schools of several states and for residents
of several counties proved effective.146 Further, “[w]hatever may be thought of the expediency of
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this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the
Constitution.”147 Hence, courts and juries may not interfere with a legislature that imposes such
regulations.148
Having settled the constitutionality of the law in terms of its value to the common good
and the judiciary’s lack of standing to evaluate the law as a public health policy choice, the
opinion turns to the specific complaints of the defendant. 149 In addition to raising concerns about
the efficacy and safety of vaccinations for the population at large, the defendant noted that,
during his youth, he personally became sick for an extended time as a result of a vaccination, and
he has since watched his son and others suffer similarly.150 The Court notes that this argument
put the legislature’s deliberations under judicial review and that “[t]he legislature assumed that
some children, by reason of their condition at the time, might not be fit subjects of vaccination,
and it is suggested—and we will not say without reason—that such is the case with some
adults.”151 He offered only generalities and his experience as a child suggested the impossibility
of telling in advance if a vaccination is safe for any particular person. 152 The majority concluded
that these arguments lacked sufficient strength and relevancy to warrant an exemption from the
vaccination requirement for the defendant have agreed upon the safety of vaccinations.153
Furthermore, granting an exemption to the defendant “would practically strip the legislative
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department of its function to care for the public health and the public safety when endangered by
epidemics of disease” because it would make it impossible to enforce any legislation mandating
vaccinations.154 The Court determined that minority factions and individuals who choose to stay
in a community and experience the benefits provided by the local government may not abide by
certain laws that a majority of duly-authorized legislators legally enacted by a majority of dulyauthorized legislators—a solid communitarian conception.155 In other words, living in a
democratic community means deferring to all of the laws of the community; liberty does not
grant individuals the right to choose to follow only the laws that are agreeable to them and ignore
the rest—a text that fits squarely into the liberal communitarian doctrine. 156
After this declaration, the Court reiterates two points made earlier. 157 First, the opinion
notes that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts bears responsibility for the health and safety of
its residents and that the national government need not involve itself in most cases.158 The law in
this case does not infringe upon the rights granted to the federal government, and which in part
justifies the law remaining in effect of the reasons that the law may remain in effect. Second, the
majority returns to the issue of the state’s police power, reaffirming that abuses reaffirming the
possibility of abuses and that, in those instances, the courts must step in to protect the people. 159
For example, with regard to the law under consideration, there could be an adult could have the
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“particular condition of his health or body” that would render it “cruel and inhuman in the last
degree” to mandate that he receive a vaccination. 160 If the commonwealth of Massachusetts or a
local jurisdiction within it were to attempt applying the law to this person, the court should act to
prevent the state’s police power from being carried to fruition. 161 On the whole, however,
precedent mandates the Court to assume the legislature meant to allow for exceptions in such
circumstances.162 The case at hand is not consistent with a circumstance that would merit such an
exemption, though.163 As a result, the Court ultimately ruled that it is unacceptable that the
defendant, “while remaining in the community, refused to obey the statute and the regulation
adopted in execution of its provisions for the protection of the public health and the public
safety, confessedly endangered by the presence of a dangerous disease.”164
B. MORE CRITERIA FOR BALANCING AND AN OVERREACHING RULING
On January 27, 2021, the Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, released its decision
in the case of Machovec v. Palm Beach County. 165 The case arrived in the Court of Appeal after a
trial court refused to grant four Floridians an emergency temporary injunction barring the
implementation of the Palm Beach County “mask mandate” (Palm Beach County Emergency
Order No. 20-12, also known as EO-12). As reported in the appellate court opinion, “EO-12
mandates that ‘facial coverings’ must be worn in Palm Beach County at businesses and
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establishments, public places, county and municipal government facilities, and while using
public transportation.”166 The order includes several exemptions, including for all children under
the age of two, all children in licensed childcare settings, adults with medical conditions that
make it unsafe for them to wear a mask, and anyone who is actively eating or drinking. 167 When
they filed the original suit, the appellants asserted that EO-12 infringed upon their rights to
privacy and due process both of which Florida enshrines in Article I of its constitution.168
According to the opinion from the Court of Appeal, the appellants held that the mask mandate
did not promote “a compelling state interest.” 169 However, the trial court disagreed; the trial
court decision, as quoted in the Court of Appeal’s opinion, states:
Plaintiffs' minimal inconvenience caused by the Mask Ordinance must be
balanced against the general public's right to not be further infected with a deadly
virus. It is beyond dispute that the potential injury to the public that would result
from enjoining the government's ability to prevent the spread of a presently
incurable, deadly, and highly communicable virus far outweighs any individual's
right to simply do as they please. 170
This time, the common good appears as a right of the general public. This right does not emanate
from the Bill of Rights. One may argue that the fact that the courts use different terms in
different cases to refer to the common good matters not. However, there is no widely agreedupon, well-established legal anchoring for favoring the common good over individual rights in
court decisions.
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The Court of Appeal quoted the lower court as determining “the requirement to wear
such a covering has a clear rational basis based on the protection of public health.” 171 Once the
trial court released its decision, appellants claimed the trial court erred in using a “rational basis
review” and the correct way to analyze the case would be through the lens of “strict scrutiny.” 172
This assertion rested on appellants’ belief that the mask mandate prevents people from refusing
medical treatment, which is a constitutional rights violation. 173 Hence, the appellate court took up
the case.
In the “Background” section of its opinion, the appellate court quotes the Palm Beach
County Code.174 It states that “[t]he County’s Board and Administrator are ‘authorized and
empowered during a state of emergency . . . to make, amend, and rescind emergency orders
deemed necessary to protect the health, safety, and/or welfare of the people of Palm Beach
County[.]’”175 Ultimately, the three appellate court judges who decided this case unanimously
ruled against the appellants—issuing a single opinion allowing the mask mandate to remain in
effect.176 The court then presents its analysis, which adds some balancing considerations.
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The court referred to multiple Florida precedential cases.177 Among these references was
a block quote from Donoho v. Allen-Rosner, where the court cited its decision from University
Med. Clinics, Inc. v. Quality Health Plans, Inc.:
To obtain a temporary injunction, the petitioner “must establish that (1)
irreparable harm will result if the temporary injunction is not entered; (2) an
adequate remedy at law is unavailable; (3) there is a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; and (4) entry of the temporary injunction will serve the
public interest.178
Further, the opinion notes that the “and” is crucial because all four of the conditions listed above
must be met for an injunction to be granted.179 One may argue that these criteria place an undue
burden on the common good. Regardless, the criteria listed above provide a framework for
determining the appropriate balance between individual rights and the common good when
someone is seeking a temporary injunction.
The appellants contended that, based on the definition of medical treatment included in
the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, mask wearing is a medical treatment and, hence, mask
mandates must be prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Article
1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. 180 The court rejects this argument, explaining that,
although the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have found that wearing a mask
provides some measure of protection to the person whose face is covered, the CDC’s principal
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reason for advising people to wear masks is to protect others—not oneself.181 According to the
CDC, approximately half of all COVID-19 transmissions have happened as a result of contact
with people who are asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic, and therefore, do not feel ill. 182
Universal mask wearing helps to prevent this kind of transmission. 183 As the opinion puts it,
“[t]hus, requiring facial coverings to be worn in public is not primarily directed at treating a
medical condition of the person wearing the mask/shield.”184 Similarly, the court quotes the
order issued by the trial court: “[T]he covering of one’s nose and mouth is designed to safeguard
other citizens.”185 The court likened the mask mandate to the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act,
which bans smoking in certain indoor settings. 186 Just as the mask mandate offers some
protection to the mask wearer but was chiefly concerned with protecting others, the indoor
smoking ban could help smokers by making it less convenient for them to smoke, but it was
enacted to protect others from secondhand smoke. 187
Another part of the appellate court’s analysis of this case returned to the question of who
has the authority to decide these kinds of issues—to make the balance.188 The opinion quotes
precedent: “It is within the police power of the State to enact laws to prevent the spread of
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infectious or contagious diseases.”189 To further support the notion that the state may mandate
certain health and safety precautions, the court raised the issue of a law requiring motorcycle
riders in Florida to wear helmets. 190 Although that law has since been discarded, a 1969 case
affirmed its constitutionality. 191 The opinion for this case quotes one line from the
aforementioned 1969 case’s decision as part of its argument in this case:
Just as “the legislature may constitutionally conclude that the cyclist’s right to be
let alone is no more precious than the corresponding right of ambulance drivers,
nurses and neurosurgeons,” . . . the Board of County Commissioners had the
legislative authority to require facial coverings to be worn in public settings (with
exemptions) in response to a virus deemed responsible for over 400,000 deaths in
the United States (as of January 20, 2021). 192
In the appellate court opinion’s conclusion, the judges continue to cite precedents to
emphasize their main points.
A person's “right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the
person's private life,” guaranteed by Article I, Section 23 of the Florida
Constitution, is an important right, but it is not absolute. “Although a person's
subjective expectation of privacy is one consideration in deciding whether a
constitutional right attaches, the final determination of an expectation's
legitimacy takes a more global view, placing the individual in the context of a
society and the values that the society seeks to foster.” [emphasis added] To
that end, “there are circumstances in which a public emergency, for instance . . .
the spread of infectious or contagious diseases or other potential public calamity,
presents an exigent circumstance before which all private rights must immediately
give way under the government's police power.” 193
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Communitarian’s desire American society to place more weight and consideration on the
common good. However, even for a liberal communitarian, this formulation may go too far. The
appellate court opinion can be interpreted to mean that rights are conditional on societal contexts
and values and that the common good should take precedence over individual rights. A liberal
communitarian position would hold that the common good, societal contexts, and individual
rights all have the same fundamental normative standing, and that none trumps the others.194
V.

CONCLUSION
The Constitution is a living document, interpreted and reinterpreted as historical

conditions change. However, the U.S has a great communitarian deficit. The pandemic revealed
that major parts of the population disregard common good, public philosophy, and jurisprudence.
This disregard is not limited to public health as the same holds true for a variety of issues
including initiatives to curb climate change, to reimagine public safety, and to defend against
domestic terrorism. Canada provides an example of a nation that incorporates the concept of
common law into law using the term “public order.” 195
The constitution should be an anchor for the common good. This can be done by
rereading the Fourth Amendment not as one that treats reasonable searches, those in which the
common good prevails over rights, as a residual category, but as one in which unreasonable
searches has the same standing as reasonable. To best implement this radical restructuring of the
fourth amendment, academics should implement one single term to be used for applicable
administrative purposes.
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Surprisingly, the possibility of a third option has not been considered by higher courts.196
Liberal communitarians believe that judicial decision makers ought to determine whether they
can find a way to serve both the common good and individual rights before seeking to determine
which way to tilt. 197
Next, the criteria for balancing needs to be consolidated.198 First, minimizing intrusions
on individual rights, if they must take place, seems to be a sound criterion. 199 However, one notes
that, the more serious the challenge to the common good, the higher the tolerance for
intrusions.200 Thus, during the height of the pandemic, the courts tolerated quarantining, which is
quite intrusive.201
There is a great need to clarify who has the authority to determine what is rational. Courts
have traditionally used the “Reasonable person” standard in their analysis, risking bias brought
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on by what a judge or jury might consider reasonable.202 This actually means that decisions are
based on what judges or the jury consider reasonable.203 In the quest to restore trust in liberal
democratic institutions, it might be best to acknowledge this fact more openly.
The doctrine of proportionality in Israeli law provides one example of a way to promote
balance between individual rights and the common good.204 There are four components of
proportionality.205 The first is the idea that legislation should advance a “proper” objective. 206
However, opinions about what is “proper” may vary. The second component of the
proportionality doctrine mandates that the government’s actions be rationally linked to its aim. 207
Thirdly, the government’s action must be the least harmful choice available in the specific
context in which the legislation is enacted. 208 Finally, and most in line with the name of the
doctrine under consideration, the benefit of the legislation must be proportional to its
infringement on individual rights. 209 In addition, most new measures should have a sunset time, a
point at which their necessity will be reviewed and, unless the measures are renewed, they will
automatically expire, on the ground that the new measures are all based on specific and likely-tochange historical conditions.
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